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The consistency of the Shannon entropy, when applied to outcomes of quantum experiments, is analysed. It
is shown that the Shannon entropy is fully consistent and its properties are never violated in quantum settings,
but attention must be paid to logical and experimental contexts. This last remark is shown to apply regardless
of the quantum or classical nature of the experiments.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its introduction in 1948, the Shannon entropy [1] has
played a central roˆle in all branches of communication the-
ory, where it allows a precise and operational definition of
useful concepts like transmission rate and channel capacity,
and has found many important applications in other branches
of science as well [2, 3]. Shannon introduced it to quantify
the amount of “uncertainty” or “choice” present in a prob-
ability distribution for a set of messages or symbols. In
this regard, his entropy possesses some mathematical prop-
erties [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] that correspond to intuitive properties
expected from a measure of uncertainty.
In a recent paper [10], however, Brukner and Zeilinger
analyse the application of the Shannon entropy to the statis-
tical outcomes of two simple quantum-mechanical thought-
experiments and of a non-quantum-mechanical, or ‘classical’,
one, and conclude that two particular properties of the Shan-
non entropy are violated in quantum experiments while hold-
ing in classical ones.
This conclusion poses serious limitations when we wish to
use the Shannon entropy, because of its particular properties,
in quantum-mechanical problems. It would be therefore rea-
sonable to ascertain in which sense or to what extent (if any)
the claimed violations occur.
Deep criticisms of the conclusions of Ref. [10] have al-
ready appeared in the literature, mainly Hall’s [11] and Timp-
son’s [12, 13]. These interesting criticisms are mainly of a
theoretical (and partly philosophical) nature, and so do not
explain whether or how the concrete and interesting thought-
experiments given in Ref. [10] really represent a violation of
the Shannon entropy’s properties.
The purpose of the present paper is more pragmatic: to re-
analyse the experiments presented in Ref. [10] and to show by
explicit calculation that they present in fact no violation of any
property of the Shannon entropy.
We shall see that the seeming “violations” appear only be-
cause the authors of Ref. [10] tacitly shift between different
contexts (different experimental arrangements), thus misap-
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plying Shannon’s formulae. In order to explain what is meant
here by ‘context’, and to make the last point clearer, let us
consider the following example:1
In another Wonderland, Alice is acquainted with two
Cheshire Cats: a Frumious one and a very Mome one. The
Frumious Cheshire Cat always appears with its tail (T ) first,
and then with the rest (R) of its body (head included), and in
these apparitions Alice always observes first only that T =
2 cm, and then that R = 3 cm, hence
“ T + R = 5 cm ”. (1)
The Mome Cheshire Cat, instead, always appear with its rest
(R) first, and then comes the tail (T ), so that, when meeting
it, Alice can first observe that R = 30 cm, and then that T =
20 cm; hence
“ R + T = 50 cm ”. (2)
Looking at Eqs. (1) and (2), Alice concludes:
“ T + R , R + T ”, (3)
or: “the commutative property of addition is violated for
Cheshire Cats”.
Is Alice’s conclusion about the commutative property cor-
rect? No. First of all, we see that the content of Eq. (1) is
really just “2 cm + 3 cm = 3 cm + 2 cm = 5 cm”, and analo-
gously for Eq. (2), hence the commutative property is in fact
clearly satisfied in those equations.
On the other hand, what Alice means by Eq. (3) is just
“2 cm + 3 cm , 30 cm + 20 cm”, so that this equation has
little to do with the commutative property of addition. In fact
Eq. (3), as it is written, makes simply no sense, because the
various mathematical symbols therein are inconsistently used:
they have different values on the right- than on the left-hand
side.
This comes about because Alice tacitly shifts from a given
context, where the symbols ‘T ’ and ‘R’ refer to the Frumious
Cheshire Cat and have some values, to a different context,
1 A less informal example is presented in the published version of this paper,
Phys. Rev. A 69, 062108 (2004).
2where the same symbols refer to the Mome Cheshire Cat and
have different values — but the commutative property of ad-
dition is not meant to apply that way. Related to this is the
fact that Alice seems to attribute a temporal meaning to the
order in which the summands appear in the additions (1)–(3),
but we know that the order of terms in an addition has no tem-
poral meaning. If Alice wishes to express temporal details,
she can do so by, e.g., appending subscripts to the symbols,
like Tt′ , Rt′′ , etc.; in any case she cannot burden the addition
operation with meanings that the latter does not have.
Hence, Alice’s incorrect conclusion stems from her using,
inconsistently, the same symbols T and R for two different and
incompatible logical and experimental contexts. She could
have used, e.g., TMome,t′ , RFrum,t′′ , etc., instead, writing her
findings as
TMome,t′ + RMome,t′′ = RMome,t′′ + TMome,t′
, TFrum,t′′ + RFrum,t′ = RFrum,t′ + TFrum,t′′ , (4)
where all symbols are consistently and informatively used and
it is clear that no violations of any mathematical property oc-
cur.
In nuce, an analogous faux pas is made in Ref. [10], al-
though less apparent, because there instead of the addition we
have more complex mathematical functions — probabilities
and entropies —, and quantum experiments take the place of
the example’s Cheshire-Cats experiments. In the mentioned
paper, the authors compare probabilities and Shannon en-
tropies pertaining to different contexts (different experimental
arrangements); thus their equations do not pertain to the prop-
erties they meant to discuss. To my knowledge, this simple
point has hitherto never been noticed in the literature, and will
be shown here by explicit calculation.
We shall also investigate how the peculiar reasoning in
Ref. [10] comes about, and find that it stems from an improper
temporal interpretation of the logical symbols ‘|’ and ‘∧’. This
point has not been noticed in the literature either.2
It is also clear that such kinds of seeming “violations”, aris-
ing through mathematical and logical misapplication, can then
easily be made to appear not only in quantum experiments, but
in classical ones as well, and this will also be shown by simple
examples.
For these purposes, some notation and definitions for prob-
abilities and the Shannon entropy will first be introduced,
where the roˆle of the context — e.g., the given experimen-
tal arrangement — is emphasized. Then, after a discussion of
the two questioned properties of the entropy, the experiments
of Ref. [10] will be presented and re-analysed. Finally, two
“counter-experiments” will be presented.
2 In fact, even Timpson [12, p. 15] seems to attach an improper temporal
sense to the logical concept of ‘joint probability’.
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
We shall work with probability theory as extended logic [7,
16, 17], so we denote by P(a | l) the probability of the proposi-
tion a given the prior knowledge l. This prior knowledge, also
called (prior) data or prior information, represents the con-
text the proposition refers to. It is useful to write explicitly
the prior knowledge — a usage advocated by Keynes [18],
Jeffreys [17, 19], Koopman [20, 21, 22], Cox [7, 23, 24],
Good [25], and Jaynes [16] — because the meaning and the
probability of a proposition always depend on a given context.
Compare, e.g., P(“Tomorrow it will snow” | “We are in Stock-
holm and it is winter”) and P(“Tomorrow it will snow” | “We
are in Rome and it is summer”).3 Even more, the probabil-
ity of a proposition can be undefined in a given context (i.e.,
that proposition is meaningless in that context): consider, e.g.,
P(“My daughter’s name is Kristina” | “I have no children”).
Common usage tends to omit the context and writes P(a) in-
stead of P(a | l), but this usage can in some cases — especially
when the context is variable, i.e., several different contexts are
considered in a discussion — lead to ambiguities, as will be
shown.
In particular, a proposition can represent an outcome of an
experiment or observation that was, is, or will be, performed.
The context in this case consists of all the details of the exper-
imental arrangement and of the theoretical model of the latter
which are necessary to assign a probability to that outcome.
This is true for both “classical” and “quantum” experiments.
The importance of the context is also evident when consid-
ering a set of propositions
A def= {ai : i = 1, . . . , na} (5)
such that, in the context l, they are mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive (i.e., one and only one of them is true). Indeed, it is
clear that the propositions may be mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive in some context while not being such in another. For
example, the propositions {“A red ball is drawn at the first
draw”, “A wooden ball is drawn at the first draw”} are mutu-
ally exclusive and exhaustive in the context “Balls are drawn
from an urn containing one red plastic ball and one blue
3 The relevance of prior knowledge is nicely expressed in the following
brief dialogue, which I could not resist quoting, between Holmes and Wat-
son [26], taking place after the two listened to a client’s statement:
“I think that I shall have a whisky and soda and a cigar
after all this cross-questioning. I had formed my conclusions
as to the case before our client came into the room.”
“My dear Holmes!”
“[. . . ] My whole examination served to turn my conjecture
into a certainty. Circumstantial evidence is occasionally very
convincing, as when you find a trout in the milk, to quote
Thoreau’s example.”
“But I have heard all that you have heard.”
“Without, however, the knowledge of pre-existing cases
which serves me so well.”
3wooden ball”, but are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaus-
tive in the context “Balls are drawn from an urn containing
one red wooden ball, one red plastic ball, and one blue
plastic ball”, and make no sense in the context “Cards are
drawn from a deck”.
In the following, propositions which are mutually exclusive
and exhaustive in a given context will be called alternatives,
and their set a set of alternatives.4 Such a set may represent
the possible, mutually exclusive outcomes in a given experi-
ment.
The probability distribution for a set of alternatives {ai : i =
1, . . . , na} in the context l will be denoted by
P(A | l) def= {P(ai | l) : i = 1, . . . , na}, (6)
and has, of course, the usual properties
P(ai ∧ ai′ | l) = 0 for i , i′, (7)∑
i
P(ai | l) = 1, (8)
where the conjunction [28, 29, 30] (sometimes also called
‘logical product’) of a and b is denoted by a ∧ b.
The Shannon entropy [1] is a function of the probability dis-
tribution for a given set of alternatives A in a given context l.
It is defined as
H[P(A | l)] def= −K
∑
i
P(ai | l) ln P(ai | l), K > 0, (9)
with the usual conventions for the units in which it is ex-
pressed and the positive constant K, and the limiting proce-
dure when vanishing probabilities are present.5 The Shannon
entropy can be considered to quantify the amount of “uncer-
tainty” associated with a probability distribution.6
Given two sets of alternatives A and B in the context l, the
set of all conjunctions of the propositions {ai} with the propo-
sitions {b j},
A ∧ B def= {ai ∧ b j : i = 1, . . . , na; j = 1, . . . , nb}, (10)
is also a set of alternatives in l, as follows from the rules of
probability theory; it will be called a composite set.7 Thus the
composite probability distribution
P(A ∧ B | l) def= {P(ai ∧ b j | l) : i = 1, . . . , na; j = 1, . . . , nb}
(11)
4 Another name for such a set could be ‘event’ (cf. Tribus [27]); Cox uses
the terms ‘(inductive) system’ [7] and (with a slightly more general mean-
ing)‘question’ [24].
5 Cox [7, 24] gives a generalisation of Shannon’s formula which is valid for
a general set of not necessarily mutually exclusive propositions.
6 A very small sample of the literature on Shannon’s entropy is represented
by the work of Kullback [31], Re´nyi [32], Acze´l et al. [4, 8], Wehrl [5],
Shore et al. [33], Jaynes [16]; see also Forte [34].
7 I prefer the term ‘composite’ to the term ‘joint’, as the latter seems to bring
about improper temporal meanings.
satisfies the properties
P
((ai ∧ b j) ∧ (ai′ ∧ b j′) | l) = 0 for i , i′ or j , j′, (12)∑
i j
P(ai ∧ b j | l) = 1. (13)
The probability distributions for the sets of alternatives A,
B, and A∧ B in the context l are related by the following stan-
dard probability rules (see e.g. Jaynes [16, Ch. 2], Jeffreys [17,
Ch. 1][19, Ch. 2], Cox [7, Ch. 1])
P(ai | l) =
∑
j
P(ai ∧ b j | l),
P(b j | l) =
∑
i
P(ai ∧ b j | l)
(14a)
(marginal probabilities), and
P(ai ∧ b j | l) = P(ai | b j ∧ l) P(b j | l)
= P(b j | ai ∧ l) P(ai | l)
(14b)
(product rule), from which
P(ai | b j ∧ l) =
P(ai ∧ b j | l)
P(b j | l) if P(b j | l) , 0,
P(b j | ai ∧ l) =
P(ai ∧ b j | l)
P(ai | l) if P(ai | l) , 0
(14c)
(Bayes’ rule) follow.
All the probability distributions for the sets of alternatives
A, B, and A ∧ B have associated Shannon entropies. It is also
possible to define the conditional entropy of the distribution
for B relative to the distribution for A, as follows:
H[P(B | A ∧ l)] def=
∑
i
P(ai | l)H[P(B | ai ∧ l)]
= −K
∑
i
P(ai | l)
∑
j
P(b j | ai ∧ l) ln P(b j | ai ∧ l). (15)
An analogous definition is given for H[P(A | B ∧ l)].
III. PROPERTIES OF THE SHANNON ENTROPY AND
QUANTUM EXPERIMENTS
The various Shannon entropies presented in the previous
section possess several mathematical properties [1, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9] which have a fairly intuitive meaning when the Shan-
non entropy is interpreted as a measure of “uncertainty”. We
shall focus our attention on two of these properties which, it
is claimed [10], are violated in quantum experiments.
Consider the probability distribution for a composite set of
alternatives A ∧ B in a context l. The entropy H[P(B | l)] and
the conditional entropy H[P(B | A ∧ l)] satisfy
H[P(B | l)] > H[P(B | A ∧ l)]. (16a)
4This property (also called concavity since it arises from the
concavity of the function −x ln x), intuitively states that the
uncertainty of the probability distribution for B in the context
l decreases or remains the same, on average, when the context
is “updated” because one of the {ai} is known to be true. An
intuitive picture can be given as follows. Imagine that some-
one performs an experiment (represented by l) consisting in
two observations (represented by the sets A and B), and writes
the results of the experiment in an observation record, say, on
a piece of paper denoted by ‘l’, under the headings ‘A’ and
‘B’. Now suppose that we know all the details of the experi-
ment except for the outcomes: we have not yet taken a look at
the record and are uncertain about what result is written under
‘B’. If we now read the result written under ‘A’, our uncer-
tainty about the result under ‘B’ will decrease or remain the
same on average (i.e., in most, though not all, cases), since the
former result can give us some clues about the latter.
The second property (strong additivity [4]) reads
H[P(A ∧ B | l)] = H[P(A | l)] + H[P(B | A ∧ l)]
= H[P(B | l)] + H[P(A | B ∧ l)], (16b)
and its intuitive meaning is that the uncertainty of the proba-
bility distribution for the composite set of alternatives A ∧ B
is given by the sum of the uncertainty of the probability distri-
bution for A and the average uncertainty of the updated prob-
ability distribution for B if one of the {ai} is known to be true,
or vice versa. Using the intuitive picture already proposed,
we are initially uncertain about both outcomes written on the
record ‘l’. This uncertainty will first decrease as we read the
outcome for ‘A’, and then disappear completely when we read
the outcome for ‘B’ (given that we do not forget what we have
read under ‘A’). Equivalently, the total uncertainty will first
decrease and then disappear as we read first the outcome un-
der ‘B’ and then the one under ‘A’.
Three remarks are appropriate here. The first is that the
above are mathematical, not physical, properties: they are not
experimentally observed regularities, but rather follow math-
ematically, through the properties of basic arithmetical func-
tions like the logarithm, once we put some numbers (the prob-
abilities P(a1 | l), P(b2 | l), P(b2 | a1 ∧ l), etc.) into the formu-
lae (9) and (15). In particular, they can be neither proven nor
disproved by experiment, but only correctly or incorrectly ap-
plied. It is for this reason that one suspects that the seeming
violations found in Ref. [10] are only caused by an incorrect
application of the formulae (16); we shall see that this is the
case, because in the mentioned paper some probabilities are
used in the right-hand sides of Eqs. (16), and (numerically)
different probabilities in the left-hand sides.
This leads us to the second remark: the above properties
hold when all the probabilities in question refer to the same
context; otherwise, they are not guaranteed to hold. This is
because if a specific set of alternatives, in two different con-
texts, has two different sets of probabilities, then it will yield,
in general, two different entropies as well. Hence we can-
not expect the formulae (16) to hold if we use, in the left-
hand sides, the probabilities relative to a given experiment,
and, in the right-hand sides, those relative to a different exper-
iment. This remark amounts simply to saying that the expres-
sion ‘x+y = y+x’ holds only if we give x and y the same value
on both sides (cf. Alice’s example in the Introduction). The
(somewhat pedantic) notation H[P(A | l)] and H[P(B | A ∧ l)],
instead of the more common H(A) and H(B | A), is used here
to stress this point.
The third remark (cf. also Koopman [22]) is that an expres-
sion like ‘B | A’ does not imply that “the observation repre-
sented by A is performed before the one represented by B”;
nor does ‘A ∧ B’ mean that the two observations are carried
out “simultaneously”. The temporal order of the observa-
tions is formally contained in the context l, and the symbols
‘|’ and ‘∧’ have a logical, not temporal, meaning. One must
be careful not to confuse logical concepts with mathematical
objects or physical procedures, even when there may be some
kind of relationship amongst them; this kind of confusion is
strictly related to what Jaynes called “the mind projection fal-
lacy” [16, 35, 36].
Consider, e.g., the following situation: an urn contains a
red, a green, and a yellow ball, and we draw two balls with-
out replacement (this is our context lu). Consider the propo-
sitions a def= “Red at the first draw”, and b def= “Green at the
second draw”. Now, suppose that we also know that the sec-
ond draw yields ‘green’; what is the probability that the first
draw yields ‘red’? The answer, to be found in any probability-
theory textbook, is P(a | b ∧ lu) = P(a ∧ b | lu)/P(b | lu) =
(1/3) × (1/2)/(1/3) = 1/2. We see that the expression ‘a | b’
does not mean that b precedes a (nor does it mean that b
“causes” a): it just expresses a logical connexion. We can
also ask: what is the probability of obtaining first ‘red’ and
then ‘green’? The answer is again standard: P(a∧b |lu) = 1/6.
We see that the expression ‘a ∧ b’ does not mean that a and b
happen simultaneously: it just expresses a logical connexion.8
Note that Shannon himself, in his paper, does not attribute
any temporal meaning to the conditional or joint entropies,
but only the proper logical one. He uses, e.g. [1, §§11 and
12], the expressions H[P(X |Y ∧ l)] and H[P(X∧Y | l)] (which
in his notation are ‘Hy(x)’ and ‘H(x, y)’ [1, §6]) where ‘Y’
represents the received signal, while ‘X’ represents the signal
source — i.e., where X actually precedes Y.9 We may also re-
mark that Shannon’s entropy formulae for channel character-
istics are not directly dependent on the actual physical details
of the system(s) constituting the channel, which can be classi-
8 We can change the example by considering, instead, the order in which
three identically prepared radioactive nuclei, in three different laboratories,
will decay. The analysis and the conclusion will nevertheless be the same.
‘Quantumness’ plays no roˆle here.
9 From Shannon’s paper: “First there is the entropy H(x) of the source or of
the input to the channel [. . . ]. The entropy of the output of the channel,
i.e., the received signal, will be denoted by H(y). [. . . ] The joint entropy of
input and output will be H(x, y). Finally there are two conditional entropies
Hx(y) and Hy(x), the entropy of the output when the input is known and
conversely. Among these quantities we have the relations H(x, y) = H(x)+
Hx(y) = H(y) + Hy(x)” [1, §11].
5cal, quantum, or even made of pegasi and unifauns. Only their
statistical properties are directly relevant.
Hence, the conjunction ai∧b j ≡ b j∧ai (and B∧A ≡ A∧B)
is commutative even if the matrix product of two operators
which can in some way be associated with these propositions
is not.
We shall see that these remarks have indeed a bearing on
the analysis presented in Ref. [10], where the validity of the
formulae (16) was analysed in two quantum experiments and
a classical one, and it was found that, seemingly, Eqs. (16) did
not hold in the quantum case, while they still held in the clas-
sical one. These experiments will be now presented using first
their original notation of Ref. [10] (indicated by the presence
of quotation marks), which makes no reference to the context,
and then re-analysed using the expanded notation introduced
above.
A. First quantum experiment
The first quantum experiment [10, Fig. 4] runs as fol-
lows. Suppose we send a vertically polarised photon through
a horizontal polarisation filter. The set of alternatives B def=
{bout, bnot-out} refers to the photon’s coming out of the filter,
with bout
def
= “The photon comes out of the horizontal filter”,
bnot-out
def
= “The photon does not come out of the horizontal
filter”. Since we are sure about bnot-out, i.e., “P(bnot-out) = 1”,
we have that
“ H(B) = 0 ”. (17)
Then we insert a diagonal (45◦) filter before the horizontal
one; the set of alternatives A refers to the photon’s coming out
of the diagonal filter, with aout and anot-out defined analogously.
Now, if we know that the photon has come out of the diagonal
filter, we are no longer sure that it will not get through the
horizontal filter, and so the uncertainty on B is increased by
knowledge of A:
“ H(B | A) > 0 ”. (18)
Thus we find
“ 0 = H(B) < H(B | A) ” (seemingly) (19)
and property (16a) is seemingly violated.
Only seemingly, though. The fact that a diagonal filter was
considered in the reasoning leading to Eq. (18) but not in the
reasoning leading to Eq. (17), makes us doubt whether the
comparison of the entropies “H(B)” and “H(B |A)” really cor-
responds to Eq. (16a): these entropies, in fact, apparently refer
to two different experimental arrangements — i.e., to two dif-
ferent contexts. It becomes evident that this is indeed the case
if we proceed by calculating numerically and explicitly all the
probabilities first, and then the entropies, keeping the context
in view.
Let us consider again the first experimental set-up, which
will be denoted by lone, where only one, horizontal, filter is
present. For the set B, we have of course that, using our nota-
tion,
P(bout | lone) = 0, P(bnot-out | lone) = 1, (20)
so that the Shannon entropy is
H[P(B | lone)] = H(0, 1) = 0 bit. (21)
At this point, asking for the probabilities for the set of alter-
natives A, we realise that the propositions aout
def
= “The photon
comes out of the diagonal filter” and anot-out
def
= “The photon
does not come out of the diagonal filter” make no sense here,
since no diagonal filter is present; consequently, there exist no
entropies like H[P(A | lone)] or H[P(B | A ∧ lone)]. So in this
experimental set-up it is not even meaningful to consider the
property (16a).
When we insert a diagonal filter before the horizontal one,
we have a new, different experimental arrangement, which
will be denoted by ltwo. In this new set-up it does make sense
to speak of both sets A and B.10 Quantum mechanics yields
the following probabilities:
P(aout | ltwo) = 12 , P(anot-out | ltwo) = 12 , (22)
P(bout | aout ∧ ltwo) = 12 ,
P(bnot-out | aout ∧ ltwo) = 12 ,
(23)
P(bout | anot-out ∧ ltwo) = 0,
P(bnot-out | anot-out ∧ ltwo) = 1.
(24)
whence, by the product rule, it follows that
P(bout | ltwo) = 14 , P(bnot-out | ltwo) = 34 . (25)
At this point we notice that the probabilities for the set B,
Eqs. (25), differ numerically from those calculated in the pre-
vious set-up, Eqs. (20). This difference forces us to take note
of the difference of the set-ups lone and ltwo; if we ignored this,
inconsistencies would arise already for the probabilities, even
before computing any entropy.
The Shannon entropy for the probability distribution for the
set B appropriate in this context is readily calculated:
H[P(B | ltwo)] = H( 14 , 34 ) ≈ 0.81 bit, (26)
10 In the original formulation of the example [10], the authors denote “by A
and B the properties of the photon to have polarization at +45◦ and hori-
zontal polarization, respectively”; so that A should perhaps be defined as
{“The photon has diagonal (45◦) polarisation”, “The photon has no diag-
onal (45◦) polarisation”}, and B analogously. However, there are problems
with these propositions. If the photon is absorbed by the diagonal filter,
then it makes no sense to say that the photon has no diagonal polarisation,
since the photon is no longer present (note that this problem has nothing to
do with the non-existence of properties of a system before an observation:
the point is that, if no photon is present, then it does not make sense to
speak about its properties anyway). For this reason the alternative proposi-
tions aout, bnot-out, etc., have been used here; however, this has not affected
the point of the experiment in Ref. [10] — namely, the seeming violation
of property (16a).
6and we see that, in fact, it differs from the one in the first
set-up: thus, in the first quantum example of Ref. [10] the ex-
pression “H(B)” is inconsistently and ambiguously used.
The conditional entropy relative to A is:
H[P(B | A ∧ ltwo)] = 0.5 bit, (27)
and, as a consequence,
0.81 bit ≈ H[P(B | ltwo)] > H[P(B | A ∧ ltwo)] = 0.5 bit, (28)
in accord with the property (16a).
So no violations of the property (16a) are found here. Equa-
tion (19), from Ref. [10], is simply incorrect, and the seeming
“violations” that arose from it disappear at once if we write
that equation more correctly as
H[P(B | lone)] < H[P(B | A ∧ ltwo)], (29)
where we see that the left-hand side refers to the set-up lone,
whereas the right-hand side refers to the different set-up ltwo,
so that the comparison is between entropies relative to dif-
ferent experiments, and the equation does not concern prop-
erty (16a). This fact escaped the attention of the authors of
Ref. [10], partly because the contexts were not explicitly writ-
ten, and partly because the probabilities were not explicitly
calculated (so that the authors did not notice that the probabil-
ities for B had two numerically different sets of values). The
authors also seem to interpret the expression “H(B)” as im-
plying that no observation must precede B, and the expression
“H(B | A)” as implying that the observation relative to B must
be preceded by the one relative to A. As already remarked,
this needs not be the case.
It should be noted that the experimental arrangements lone
and ltwo are incompatible, also in the formal sense that their
conjunction lone ∧ ltwo is false. We could erroneously see ltwo
as a “more detailed” description of lone, equivalent, for exam-
ple, to the conjunction of lone and the proposition “Moreover,
a diagonal polarisation filter is present between the photon
source and the horizontal filter”. But this is not the case: lone
states that nothing is present between the source and the hori-
zontal filter; if it had been otherwise, and lone had left open the
possibility that something unknown could be between source
and filter (a linear or circular polarisation filter, or a mirror,
or an opaque screen, or something else), then we should have
assigned a different state to the photon reaching the horizontal
filter, and the calculation of the probabilities would have been
very different [37].
B. Second quantum experiment
The second experiment [10, Fig. 5] is as follows. We send a
spin-1/2 particle with spin up along the z axis through a Stern-
Gerlach apparatus aligned along the axis a that lies in the xz
plane and forms an angle α with the z axis. Let us denote by
A the set {aup, adown} with aup
def
= “The particle comes out with
spin up along a” and adown
def
= “The particle comes out with
spin down along a”. We have the following probabilities, in
the notation of Ref. [10]:
“ P(aup) = cos2 α2 , P(adown) = sin2 α2 ”, (30)
and a corresponding Shannon entropy which amounts to
“ H(A) = H(cos2 α2 , sin2 α2 ) ”. (31)
The particle then proceeds to a second Stern-Gerlach appara-
tus aligned along the x axis; let us denote the corresponding
set of alternatives by B def= {bup, bdown}, where bup and bdown are
defined analogously to aup and adown above. The conditional
probabilities for B relative to the outcomes for A are:
“ P(bup | aup) = cos2(pi4 − α2 ) ”,
“ P(bdown | aup) = sin2(pi4 − α2 ) ”, (32)
“ P(bup | adown) = sin2( pi4 − α2 ) ”,
“ P(bdown | adown) = cos2( pi4 − α2 ) ”, (33)
and we can easily calculate the following Shannon conditional
entropy:
“ H(B | A) = cos2 α2 × H
(
cos2 α2 , sin
2 α
2
)
+ sin2 α2 × H
(
sin2 α2 , cos
2 α
2
)
= H
(
cos2 α2 , sin
2 α
2
)
”.
(34)
The sum of the entropies thus far calculated is
“ H(A) + H(B | A) = 2 H(cos2 α2 , sin2 α2 ) ”. (35)
Now we suppose to exchange the two Stern-Gerlach appa-
ratus, putting the one along x before the one along a. We then
find the following probabilities for B:
“ P(bup) = 12 , P(bdown) = 12 ”, (36)
with the associated Shannon entropy
“ H(B) = H( 12 , 12 ) ”. (37)
The conditional probabilities, given by quantum theory, for
the set A relative to the outcomes for B are:
“ P(aup | bup) = sin2( pi4 − α2 ) ”,
“ P(adown | bup) = cos2(pi4 − α2 ) ”, (38)
“ P(aup | bdown) = cos2(pi4 − α2 ) ”,
“ P(adown | bdown) = sin2(pi4 − α2 ) ”, (39)
and together with the probabilities (36) they lead to the condi-
tional entropy
“ H(A | B) = sin2 α2 × H
(
sin2 α2 , cos
2 α
2
)
+ cos2 α2 × H
(
cos2 α2 , sin
2 α
2
)
= H
(
cos2 α2 , sin
2 α
2
)
”.
(40)
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“ H(B) + H(A | B) = H( 12 , 12 ) + H(cos2 α2 , sin2 α2 ) ”, (41)
but this is in general (e.g. for α = pi/4) different from the
sum (35), and thus we find that, in general,
“ H(A) + H(B | A) , H(B) + H(A | B) ” (seemingly), (42)
in seeming contradiction with the property (16b).
However, we notice that two different relative positions of
the Stern-Gerlach apparatus were considered, in order to ar-
rive at Eqs. (35) and (41) respectively. This makes the seem-
ing contradiction above just an artifact produced, again, by
the comparison of Shannon entropies relative to two different
experimental arrangements, analogously to what happened in
the experiment with photons previously discussed. Also in
this case, this is shown by an explicit calculation of all the
probabilities relative to the experiments.
In the first set-up, which can be denoted by m, we send
the spin-1/2 particle to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus oriented
along a (associated to the set of alternatives A), which is in
turn placed before the one oriented along x (associated to the
set B). Basic quantum-mechanical rules yield the following
probabilities (in our notation):
P(aup | m) = cos2 α2 , P(adown | m) = sin2 α2 , (43a)
P(bup | aup ∧ m) = cos2(pi4 − α2 ),
P(bdown | aup ∧ m) = sin2(pi4 − α2 ), (43b)
P(bup | adown ∧ m) = sin2(pi4 − α2 ),
P(bdown | adown ∧ m) = cos2( pi4 − α2 ), (43c)
and these are sufficient to calculate, by the product rule (14b),
the joint probabilities
pab
def
= P(aup ∧ bup | m) = cos2 α2 · cos2
(
pi
4 −
α
2
)
, (44a)
pa¯b
def
= P(aup ∧ bdown | m) = cos2 α2 · sin2
(
pi
4 −
α
2
)
, (44b)
pa¯b
def
= P(adown ∧ bup | m) = sin2 α2 · sin2
(
pi
4 −
α
2
)
, (44c)
pa¯¯b
def
= P(adown ∧ bdown | m) = sin2 α2 · cos2
(
pi
4 −
α
2
)
. (44d)
The formulae above show clearly that, as remarked in §II, it
does make sense to consider the composite probability of the
outcomes of the two temporally separated observations, as a
composite probability needs have nothing to do with the fact
that the observations are performed “simultaneously” or not.
From the joint probabilities, we can compute all probabili-
ties involved in this set-up. Applying the marginal probability
rule (14a) and Bayes’ rule (14c) we find:
P(aup | m) = pab + pa¯b, P(adown | m) = pa¯b + pa¯¯b, (45)
P(bup | m) = pab + pa¯b, P(bdown | m) = pa¯b + pa¯¯b, (46)
P(aup | bup ∧ m) = pabpab + pa¯b ,
P(adown | bup ∧ m) = pa¯bpab + pa¯b ,
(47)
P(aup | bdown ∧ m) = pa¯bpa¯b + pa¯¯b
,
P(adown | bdown ∧ m) = pa¯¯bpa¯b + pa¯¯b
,
(48)
P(bup | aup ∧ m) = pabpab + pa¯b
,
P(bdown | aup ∧ m) = pa¯bpab + pa¯b
,
(49)
P(bup | adown ∧ m) = pa¯bpa¯b + pa¯¯b
,
P(bdown | adown ∧ m) = pa¯¯bpa¯b + pa¯¯b
.
(50)
Here the probabilities (43) have been re-written in terms of
the joint probabilities.
A look at Eqs. (47) and (48) shows that Bayes’ rule also
applies in “quantum experiments”, and provides a counter-
example to the incorrect statement that the expression ‘aup |
bup’ would mean “bup precedes aup”.
We can proceed to calculate the Shannon entropies
H[P(A | m)] = −K[(pab + pa¯b) ln(pab + pa¯b) + (pa¯b + pa¯¯b) ln(pa¯b + pa¯¯b)], (51)
H[P(B | m)] = −K[(pab + pa¯b) ln(pab + pa¯b) + (pa¯b + pa¯¯b) ln(pa¯b + pa¯¯b)], (52)
as well as the conditional entropies
H[P(B | A ∧ m)] = K (pab + pa¯b)
(
−
pab
pab + pa¯b
ln pab
pab + pa¯b
−
pa¯b
pab + pa¯b
ln
pa¯b
pab + pa¯b
)
+ K (pa¯b + pa¯¯b)
(
−
pa¯b
pa¯b + pa¯¯b
ln pa¯b
pa¯b + pa¯¯b
−
pa¯¯b
pa¯b + pa¯¯b
ln
pa¯¯b
pa¯b + pa¯¯b
)
= K [−pab ln pab − pa¯b ln pa¯b − pa¯b ln pa¯b − pa¯¯b ln pa¯¯b
+ (pab + pa¯b) ln(pab + pa¯b) + (pa¯b + pa¯¯b) ln(pa¯b + pa¯¯b)], (53)
8H[P(A | B ∧ m)] = K (pab + pa¯b)
(
−
pab
pab + pa¯b
ln
pab
pab + pa¯b
−
pa¯b
pab + pa¯b
ln
pa¯b
pab + pa¯b
)
+ K (pa¯b + pa¯¯b)
(
−
pa¯b
pa¯b + pa¯¯b
ln
pa¯b
pa¯b + pa¯¯b
−
pa¯¯b
pa¯b + pa¯¯b
ln
pa¯¯b
pa¯b + pa¯¯b
)
= K [−pab ln pab − pa¯b ln pa¯b − pa¯b ln pa¯b − pa¯¯b ln pa¯¯b
+ (pab + pa¯b) ln(pab + pa¯b) + (pa¯b + pa¯¯b) ln(pa¯b + pa¯¯b)], (54)
where the expressions have been simplified making use of the additivity property of the logarithm.
Finally, from Eqs. (51) and (53), (52) and (54), we find
H[P(A | m)] + H[P(B | A ∧ m)] ≡ H[P(B | m)] + H[P(A | B ∧ m)]
= −K (pab ln pab + pa¯b ln pa¯b + pa¯b ln pa¯b + pa¯¯b ln pa¯¯b)
≡ H[P(A ∧ B | m)],
(55)
whence we see that the property (16b) is satisfied (we find,
e.g., that H[P(A | m)] + H[P(B | A ∧ m)] ≡ H[P(B | m)] +
H[P(A | B ∧ m)] ≡ H[P(A ∧ B | m)] ≈ 1.20 bit, for α = pi/4).
We note that the way in which Eq. (55) has been found
does not depend on the numerical values of the probabilities
{pi j}, but only on the additivity property of the logarithm; so
the calculations above can be seen as a mathematical proof of
the property (16b) for the special case of sets with only two
alternatives.
If we invert the positions of the two Stern-Gerlach appara-
tus, placing the one oriented along x (associated to the set B)
before the one oriented along a (associated to the set A), we
then realise a new, different experimental arrangement, which
can be denoted by minv. The probabilities for the sets of al-
ternatives A and B will thus differ from those in m: we have
indeed
P(bup | minv) = 12 , P(bdown | minv) = 12 , (56a)
P(aup | bup ∧ minv) = sin2( pi4 − α2 ),
P(adown | bup ∧ minv) = cos2(pi4 − α2 ), (56b)
P(aup | bdown ∧ minv) = cos2(pi4 − α2 ),
P(adown | bdown ∧ minv) = sin2( pi4 − α2 ). (56c)
It is clear that, from this point on, we can proceed as in the
analysis of the first set-up, obtaining
H[P(A | minv)] + H[P(B | A ∧ minv)]
= H[P(B | minv)] + H[P(A | B ∧ minv)]
= −K (p′ab ln p′ab + p′a¯b ln p′a¯b
+ p′
a¯b ln p
′
a¯b + p
′
a¯¯b ln p
′
a¯¯b),
≡ H[P(A ∧ B | minv)]
(57)
where the {p′i j} are the values of the joint probabilities {P(ai ∧
b j | minv)}, different, in general, from the {pi j}. In any case,
property (16b) is again satisfied in the new context (we have,
e.g., H[P(A | minv)] + H[P(B | A ∧ minv)] ≡ H[P(B | minv)] +
H[P(A|B∧minv)] ≡ H[P(A∧B|minv)] ≈ 1.60 bit, for α = pi/4).
Thus we have found no inconsistencies in this second ex-
periment either: Equation (42), from Ref. [10], is simply in-
correct, and can more correctly be written as
H[P(A | m)] + H[P(B | A ∧ m)]
, H[P(B | minv)] + H[P(A | B ∧ minv)], (58)
or equivalently and more briefly as
H[P(A ∧ B | m)] , H[P(A ∧ B | minv)], (59)
and its content is that the Shannon entropies in the experiment
m are in general different from those in the different experi-
ment minv. This does not surprise us, since the experiments
have different set-ups.
The fact that Eq. (42) does not pertain to property (16b)
is not noticed in Ref. [10], again because the contexts are
not kept explicit in the notation. Moreover, the expression
“H(B |A)” is considered there as implying that the observation
corresponding to A is performed before the one corresponding
to B:11 it is for this reason that, in order to calculate “H(B |A)”,
the authors consider the experiment in which the observation
corresponding to A is performed before the one correspond-
ing to B, but then, in order to calculate “H(A | B)”, they feel
compelled to change the order of the observations — with the
only effect of changing the whole problem and all probabili-
ties instead! But, as already remarked, the conditional symbol
‘|’ does not have that meaning. The point is that the temporal
order of acquisition of knowledge about two physical events
does not necessarily correspond to the temporal order in which
these events occur.
C. Classical experiment
Together with the two quantum experiments, the authors of
Ref. [10] also present an example of a classical experiment
11 Cf. the discussion of the formula “H(A) + H(B | A) = H(B) + H(A | B)” in
Ref. [10, §III].
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is useful to re-analyse this example as well, in order to show
that, in fact, it is not an instance of confirmation of the prop-
erty (16b), because it, too, involves two different experimental
arrangements.
The idea [10, Fig. 3] is as follows. We fill a box with four
balls of different colours (black and white) and compositions
(plastic and wood). There are two black plastic balls, one
white plastic ball, one white wooden ball. We shake the box,
draw a ball blindfold, and consider the set A def= {ablack, awhite}
for the ball’s being black or white. If the ball is black, then
we put all black balls in a new box, draw a new ball from this
box, and consider the set B def= {bplastic, bwood} for this ball’s
being plastic or wooden. We proceed analogously if the first
drawn ball was white instead.12 Let us denote the set-up just
described by n.
The probabilities of first drawing a black or a white ball are
respectively P(ablack | n) = 1/2 and P(awhite | n) = 1/2 and thus
their Shannon entropy is
H[P(A | n)] = H( 12 , 12 ) = 1 bit. (60)
The conditional probabilities of the second drawn ball’s being
plastic or wooden, given the outcome of the first observation,
are
P(bplastic | ablack ∧ n) = 1, P(bwood | ablack ∧ n) = 0, (61)
if the first result was ‘black’, and
P(bplastic | awhite ∧ n) = 12 , P(bwood | awhite ∧ n) = 12 , (62)
if it was ‘white’. From these probabilities the following Shan-
non conditional entropy can be computed:
H[P(B | A ∧ n)] = 12 H(1, 0) + 12 H
( 1
2 ,
1
2
)
= 12 × 0 bit +
1
2 × 1 bit = 0.5 bit.
(63)
Combining Eqs. (60) and (63) we obtain
H[P(A | n)] + H[P(B | A ∧ n)] = 1.5 bit. (64)
Now we suppose to make the observations in inverse order
instead. We shake the initial box, draw a ball, consider first the
set B def= {bplastic, bwood} for the ball’s being plastic or wooden.
Depending on the outcome we fill a new box either with the
plastic or the wooden balls, and draw a new ball; then we
consider the set A def= {ablack, awhite} for the new ball. Let us
12 In Brukner and Zeilinger’s original example, the black and white balls are
put into two separate boxes after the first draw, and a ball is drawn from
each box separately. But these two final draws are then related to two sepa-
rate observations, not one, so that in total we have three observations in this
experiment, and the formula (16b) is not even appropriate. The experiment
has thus been modified here, in order to preserve the two authors’ original
intention.
denote this new experiment by ninv. It is clear that n and ninv
are really different experiments, for the following reason: in
n, between the two draws, the second box contains black or
white balls; while in ninv it contains plastic or wooden balls.
The probabilities for the set B this time are P(bplastic |ninv) =
3
4 and P(bwood | ninv) = 14 , with an entropy
H[P(B | ninv)] = H( 34 , 14 ) ≈ 0.81 bit, (65)
while the conditional probabilities for A are
P(ablack | bplastic ∧ ninv) = 23 ,
P(awhite | bplastic ∧ ninv) = 13 ,
(66)
if the first result was ‘plastic’, and
P(ablack | bwood ∧ ninv) = 0,
P(awhite | bwood ∧ ninv) = 1,
(67)
if it was ‘wooden’. The conditional entropy is
H[P(A | B ∧ ninv)] = 34 H
( 2
3 ,
1
3
)
+ 14 H(0, 1)
≈ 34 × 0.92 bit +
1
3 × 0 bit
≈ 0.69 bit,
(68)
and adding this time Eqs. (65) and (68), we find
H[P(B | ninv)] + H[P(A | B ∧ ninv)] = 1.5 bit. (69)
We see that the entropies (64) and (69) are equal,
H[P(A | ninv)] + H[P(B | A ∧ ninv)]
= H[P(B | ninv)] + H[P(A | B ∧ ninv)], (70)
which is equivalent to
H[P(A ∧ B | n)] = H[P(A ∧ B | ninv)], (71)
but it is clear that this is not the statement of property (16b),
because the right- and left-hand sides of this equation refer to
two different experiments. The content of the equality above
is only that the Shannon entropies for the probability distribu-
tions for the composite set of alternatives A ∧ B are equal in
the two experiments n and ninv.
IV. THE R ˆOLE OF “QUANTUMNESS”
We have shown thus far that the quantum experiments in
Ref. [10] did not involve any violation of the Shannon en-
tropy’s properties. However, we may still imagine someone
raising the following argument:
“Very well, the properties (16) are not vio-
lated in any experiment. But one notices that the
equality for different contexts
H[P(A ∧ B | n)] = H[P(A ∧ B | ninv)], (71)r
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while holding in the classical experiment of
§III C, does not hold in general in the quantum
one of §III B, where it is found instead that
H[P(A ∧ B | m)] , H[P(A ∧ B | minv)]. (59)r
From this particular case, one can see that in clas-
sical experiments the Shannon entropy remains
the same if the temporal order of observations
is changed, whereas in quantum experiments the
entropy changes together with the change in tem-
poral order. This phenomenon is thus a pecu-
liarity of the quantum nature of the experiments
— a sort of ‘quantum-context-dependence’ of the
Shannon entropy.”
But this argument has no validity, of course. The Shan-
non entropy is always “context dependent”, and this comes
from the fact that probabilities are always context dependent,
in both classical and quantum experiments. We can further
and illustrate this fact by means of two more experiments,
which will also serve as counter-examples of the ones already
discussed.
A. First counter-example
The first counter-example is a modification, based on the
examples presented by Kirkpatrick [38, 39] of the experiment
with the balls discussed in §III C.13 The balls are in addition
big or small as well now: there are one big black plastic ball,
one small black plastic ball, one small white plastic ball, and
one small white wooden ball.
Initially, we prepare the box so that it contains only all small
balls. Then we shake the box, draw a ball blindfold, and con-
sider the set A def= {ablack, awhite} for the ball’s being black or
white. If the drawn ball is black, then we prepare the box so
that it contains only all black balls (also the big black one that
was initially not in the box), draw a new ball from this box,
and consider the set B def= {bplastic, bwood} for this ball’s being
plastic or wooden. We proceed analogously if the first drawn
ball was white.14 It is easy to see that, in the set-up just de-
scribed, denoted by k, we have the following probabilities:
P(ablack | k) = 13 , P(awhite | k) = 23 , (72)
P(bplastic | ablack ∧ k) = 1, P(bwood | ablack ∧ k) = 0, (73)
P(bplastic | awhite ∧ k) = 12 , P(bwood | awhite ∧ k) = 12 . (74)
13 Cf. also the toy models discussed by Hardy [40] and Spekkens [41].
14 The Reader should not, too simply, identify the “system” here with some
specific group of balls. It is rather associated with a variable collection
of balls, in analogy with a classical open system associated with variable
number (and species) of particles.
The Shannon entropies are
H[P(A | k)] = H( 13 , 23 ) ≈ 0.92 bit, (75)
H[P(B | A ∧ k)] = 13 H(1, 0) + 23 H
( 1
2 ,
1
2
)
= 13 × 0 bit +
2
3 × 1 bit ≈ 0.67 bit,
(76)
and their sum is
H[P(A | k)] + H[P(B | A ∧ k)]
≡ H[P(B | k)] + H[P(A | B ∧ k)]
≡ H[P(A ∧ B | k)] ≈ 1.58 bit. (77)
Now let us consider the set-up kinv, in which the observa-
tions are made in reverse order, but with the same general pro-
cedure. The probabilities are then:
P(bplastic | kinv) = 23 , P(bwood | kinv) = 13 , (78)
P(ablack | bplastic ∧ kinv) = 23 , (79)
P(awhite | bplastic ∧ kinv) = 13 , (80)
P(ablack | bwood ∧ kinv) = 0, (81)
P(awhite | bwood ∧ kinv) = 1. (82)
These lead to the entropies
H[P(B | kinv)] = H( 23 , 13 ) ≈ 0.92 bit, (83)
H[P(A | B ∧ kinv)] = 23 H
( 2
3 ,
1
3
)
+ 13 H(0, 1)
≈ 23 × 0.92 bit +
1
3 × 0 bit
≈ 0.61 bit,
(84)
and the sum
H[P(B | kinv)] + H[P(A | B ∧ kinv)]
≡ H[P(A | kinv)] + H[P(B | A ∧ kinv)]
≡ H[P(A ∧ B | kinv)] ≈ 1.53 bit.
(85)
Comparing Eqs. (77) and (85) we find
H[P(A ∧ B | k)] , H[P(A ∧ B | kinv)]. (86)
Hence, for this experiment, of a clearly classical nature, we
obtain different statistics and entropies depending on the order
in which we observe colour and composition.15
Note, in any case, that in each of the two set-ups —
Eqs. (77) and (85) — the properties (16) are always satisfied,
just as in the quantum experiments.
15 We may note, incidentally, that it has long been known that the thermody-
namic entropy of a classical thermodynamic system in a non-equilibrium
state depends on its complete previous history [42].
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B. Second counter-example
The second counter-example is of a quantum-mechanical
nature. It runs precisely like the experiment with spin-1/2 par-
ticles discussed in §III B, except that now the particle has ini-
tially spin up, not along the z axis, but along the axis b that
bisects the angle âx (i.e., b lies in the xaz plane and forms an
angle β def= pi/4−α/2 with both the x and a axes; remember that
α is the angle âz). The analysis of this experiment proceeds
completely along the lines of the re-analysis of §III B, if we
introduce the contexts q and qinv, and change Eqs. (43) with
P(aup | q) = cos2 β2 , P(adown | q) = sin2 β2 , (87a)
P(bup | aup ∧ q) = cos2 β,
P(bdown | aup ∧ q) = sin2 β,
(87b)
P(bup | adown ∧ q) = sin2 β,
P(bdown | adown ∧ q) = cos2 β,
(87c)
and Eqs. (56) with
P(bup | qinv) = cos2 β2 , P(bdown | qinv) = sin2 β2 , (88a)
P(aup | bup ∧ qinv) = sin2 β,
P(adown | bup ∧ qinv) = cos2 β,
(88b)
P(aup | bdown ∧ qinv) = cos2 β,
P(adown | bdown ∧ qinv) = sin2 β.
(88c)
It is obvious that this leads to the equalities P(ai ∧ b j | q) =
P(ai ∧ b j | qinv) and eventually to the equality
H[P(A ∧ B | q)] = H[P(A ∧ B | qinv)], (89)
exactly as it happened in the experiment with the balls of
§III C (for α = pi/4, e.g., we have H[P(A ∧ B | q)] ≈ 0.83 bit).
But here the experiment is a purely quantum one: we see in-
deed that the observables do not commute here, the initial state
is pure, and its density matrix is not diagonal in either of the
observables’ bases. Compare this result with the discussion in
Ref. [43].
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that the properties of the Shannon entropy
are not violated in quantum experiments, contrary to the con-
clusions of Ref. [10]. In that paper, an idiosyncratic temporal
interpretation of the conditional symbol ‘|’ and of the conjunc-
tion symbol ‘∧’ leads the authors to change experimental set-
ups in order to calculate various entropies. As a result, they
compare entropies relative to different experimental arrange-
ments instead, and do not notice that the probabilities are also
different, and so their results (Eqs. (19) and (42) in this paper),
besides not being formally correctly written, do not pertain to
the properties of the Shannon entropy (Eqs. (16)), which refer
to a single, well-defined experiment and hold unconditionally.
The peculiar results arising from the comparison of en-
tropies relative to different experimental contexts can thus ap-
pear or not appear in any kind of experiments, classical as well
as quantum; this has been shown by means of two counter-
examples: a classical one, in which a change in the temporal
order of the experiment leads to a change in entropy values,
and a genuinely quantum one, in which the same temporal
change leads to no entropy changes.
A conclusion is that Bohr’s dictum ought to be observed
also in mathematical notation, and not only in the analysis of
quantum phenomena, but in the analysis of classical phenom-
ena as well, because probabilities — and, consequently, Shan-
non entropies — always depend on “the whole experimental
arrangement” [44] taken into account.
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